C O N T E X T 9 7 : N O V E M B E R 2 0 0 6 both built in 1870, and therefore came ultimately to the conclusion, not without doubt, that: ‘the terrace has not been taken out of the curtilage by the changes which had taken place, and remained so closely related physically or geographically to the mill as to constitute with it a single unit and to be comprised within its curtilage in the sense that those words were used in this subsection.’ The threefold test set out in Calderdale remains the key to analysing this issue, and has been applied by the court in a number of subsequent cases that have explored particular aspects of this problem. The extent of curtilage in the case of structures such as ice houses, garden temples and ha-has in the grounds of a country house was considered by Sir Frank Layfield, sitting as deputy judge inWatson-Smyth v Secretary of State (see Figure 8). He concluded, first, that where one structure that is clearly ancillary to a listed principal building is listed in its own right, that does not of itself mean that the ancillary structure is outside the curtilage of the principal building. Many such structures are listed because of their own merit, but are clearly within the curtilage of listed buildings. Second, it can not be assumed that each structure in such a group has its own, distinct curtilage, for that might lead to the splitting up of a single, clearly defined curtilage into indefinable parcels. As to the situation that sometimes occurs where there are within a single area of land a number of buildings, some but not all of which are listed, and none of which is more significant than the others, this was considered in Re West Norwood Cemetery, in the context of a large municipal cemetery. It was held that ‘the effect of listing 67 buildings and monuments within a clearly defined area means that... the whole of the cemetery is effectively within the listing’.That may have been correct on the particular facts of that case, but the approach should not be pushed too far. On the other hand, it has been confirmed that not every building has or is capable of having a curtilage. At the Bishopsgate Goods Yard, in East London, the secretary of state had listed, some while earlier, the entrance to an older structure, of which most of the remainder had perished; and more recently a historic viaduct running through the middle. In relation to the former, Ouseley J (in Hammerton v LUL) held that ‘it seems odd to suppose the gates and walls themselves had a curtilage and that those other parts lay within the curtilage’. The same would no doubt apply to features such as gate lodges, boundary walls, bollards, and monuments that have been listed in their own right. Frequently they will be within the curtilage of other buildings that have also been listed, but where they are not, the listing of a bollard does not give rise to protection for the unremarkable building in the forecourt of which it is standing. Visual matters may occasionally be significant. This has not yet been tested in the courts, but was the subject of an appeal decision, relating to a group of buildings surrounding a farmyard in Chipping Campden in Gloucestershire. The farmhouse on one side was included in the list in 1960. The other buildings surrounding the yard were by that date probably no longer in agricultural use, and were by the date of the appeal in separate ownership; one had been turned into a separate dwelling. The secretary of state considered that, although a substantial portion of the other buildings surrounding the farmyard were now ancillary to the new dwelling in the practical sense, the visual function of those buildings, and of the new dwelling itself, continued to relate to the former farmhouse; he thus decided that all the buildings surrounding the yard were within the curtilage of the farmhouse (even though it was described in the list as being of no special interest). This should be contrasted with Morris v Wrexham CBC and the National Assembly, discussed in the previous article, which suggests that the sole question was what was the position at the date of the listing – subsequent events are irrelevant. The Court of Appeal has considered the issue of curtilage relatively recently, in the case of Skerritts of Nottingham Ltd v Secretary of State. This concerned the Grade II listed Grimsdyke Hotel in Harrow (the former residence of W S Gilbert). Skerritts, the owners of the hotel, had installed double glazing in a stable block, situated some 200 yards from the hotel (see Figure 6). No listed building consent had been sought for the operation. The local authority began enforcement proceedings, on the basis that the stable block lay within the curtilage of the hotel, so that consent should have first been obtained. Skerritts maintained that, on the basis of the decision in Dyer v Dorset CC (see below), no listed building consent was required, since the curtilage of a building must be small. This latter view was accepted by Mr George Bartlett QC, sitting as a deputy judge, when the matter came before him. Figure 6. Grim’s Dyke, Harrow (Skerritt’s of Nottingham v Secretary of State)
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