C O N T E X T 9 6 : S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 6 The extent to which the listing of a building extends so as to include a subsidiary building or structure was considered in the key cases of Calderdale and Debenhams, outlined in the previous article in this series. The principles laid down in those decisions were then developed by the courts in a number of subsequent cases, notably Watts v Secretary of State and R v Camden LBC, ex p Bellamy in 1991, and Morris v Wrexham CBC and the National Assembly in 2002. Figure 3: Bix Manor, Oxfordshire (Watts v Secretary of State) occupation. That property was being put to a wholly independent use unassociated with Bix Manor... At the time of listing there was no functional connection and that section of wall did not in any sense serve the listed building. It was clearly ancillary to another separate building and, in my judgment, was not a structure ancillary to Bix Manor’. The wall was thus not subject to listed building control. If, therefore, an object or structure is to be treated as part of a listed building, it must at the date of listing be associated with the building that is itself included in the list, and not merely associated with a building that is only treated as being part of that building by virtue of section 1(5). Figure 4: Church Row, Hampstead (R v Camden LBC, ex parte Bellamy) LEGAL BRIEFING The extent of listing (2) In the second extract from his new book, Charles Mynors explores further case law relating to ancillary buildings, and explains the rules as to fixtures and fittings. Watts concerned the demolition of part of a wall (running from A to D in Figure 3) that ran alongside a road, between Bix Manor, in Oxfordshire, and a nearby barn. The barn had been in the curtilage of the Manor House until 1981, when the owner of both properties sold the Manor House but retained the barn in its own curtilage. The Manor House was listed in 1985, together with other ancillary buildings to the south; but the listing did not include either the barn to the north or the wall. A section of wall (from B to C) was removed; and the planning authority took enforcement action to secure its reinstatement. The deputy judge, after considering at length the judgments in Calderdale and Debenhams, held as follows: ‘At the date of the listing, the section of wall formed part of the curtilage of a property separate from the listed building in terms of ownership and physical The next case, R v Camden LBC, ex parte Bellamy, concerned two buildings in Hampstead. 22 Perrin’s Walk, which was not itself included in the list, had originally formed the stable or coach house for 22 Church Row, which had been included in the list in 1950 (see Figure 4). It was agreed that the two properties had been in the same ownership until 1970, and the garden between them was used at all material times by the owners and occupiers of 22 Church Row. There was, however, a dispute as to the use of 22 Perrin’sWalk at the date of listing. It may have been used as a garage for 22 Church Row, or it may have been used separately for car repairs on a commercial basis. Nolan L J concluded: ‘The legal position was by no means simple, but if, at the time of listing in 1950, 22 Perrin’s Walk was in use as the garage or coach house of 22 Church Row, then on the basis of the test
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